

A version of Srinivasan's argument for eternal anger

1a. If A really knows that x was wrong [and _____]
then A is angry about x .

- Conversely: If A is not angry about x , then A does not really know that x was wrong [or the conditions in the blank are not met].

2a. If “ x was wrong at such and such a time [and ...]” is true, then it is eternally true that x was wrong at such and such a time [and ...].

3a. Whenever someone really knows that a wrong thing is wrong, this is [apt / permissible / *prima facie* obligatory ?].

4a. Thus, eternal anger is [apt / permissible / *prima facie* obligatory].

i. What evidence supports 1a? Examples involving other emotions may be helpful here.

ii. Which premise do you find least plausible? Why?

A consequence-based arguments against (eternal) anger

1b. When A's anger does not help A to change things for the better, then A's anger does more harm than good.

- A's anger is [usually? always?] unpleasant for A.
- A's anger is [offputting?] to third parties.

2b. ...

3b. Thus, when A's anger does not help A to change things for the better, it is wrong for A to be angry.

A Thomson-inspired objection to Srinivasan

1c. If A is angry about wrongs to people that A does not know personally [or have personal ties to?], this anger is inapt / uncalled for.

Anger and relationships

1d. If A is angry at those they [love? are friends with?] this is inapt / wrong.